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I. Introduction 
‘If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change’. The bon mot from 
Giuseppe di Lampedusa’s roman, The Leopard, is often quoted today in relation to Europe’s 
current challenges. After the Brexit referendum, it is now a widely shared opinion that the 
European Union needs a new vision. This new vision requires the reopening of the debate 
about the proper relationship between nation states and international organisations. The 
question is whether there is an appetite for a similar debate about the European human rights 
regime. Even if many decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter the 
ECtHR, the Strasbourg court, or the Court) are fiercely criticised, the dominant position 
seems to be that the European human rights regime functions reasonably well. The Court is 
often called the ‘conscience of Europe’ and is held in high esteem by commentators. As one 
of those commentators puts it, the ECtHR is ‘the crown jewel of the world’s most advanced 
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international system for protecting civil and political liberties.’1 Although the Izmir 
Declaration mentions the need ‘to pursue long-term strategic reflections about the future role 
of the Court’2 and the Brighton Declaration devotes a whole section to this issue3, these 
reflections revolve primarily around how the Court can be more effective at what it is already 
doing, and not around the very foundations of the Court’s legitimacy.4  
However, this does not mean that there are no discordant voices. Most of the critiques 
that challenge the foundations of the European human rights regime originate within the 
United Kingdom. As Robert Spano, the Icelandic judge of the ECtHR, says: ‘It is true, that 
the Court has over the years been criticised for “judicial activism”, but the charges levelled 
against the Court in the UK over the past two years have been unprecedented.’5  
According to the manifesto of the governing Conservative party, and despite the UK’s 
current preoccupation with the Brexit process, the current legal framework of human rights 
protection will be revisited after the UK leaves the European Union.  
These critiques are often dismissed out of hand and are rejected as ‘lacking substance’, 6 
‘misconceived as a matter of principle’,7 or being ‘fantasies.’8 I share most of the worries of 
                                            
1 LR Helfer, 'Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle 
of the European Human Rights Regime' (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 125, 125. 
2
 Izmir Declaration, para 15, adopted at the High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of 
Human Rights. Izmir, 2011. 
3
 Brighton Declaration, section G, adopted at the High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of 
Human Rights, Brighton, 2012. 
4
 See also The Brussels Declaration, adopted at the High-level Conference on the Implementation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, Our Shared Responsibility, Brussels 2015 and the Copenhagen 
Declaration, adopted at High Level Conference on Reform of the Convention System, Copenhagen, 2018. The 
individual justice versus constitutional justice debate does not tackle the issue of legitimacy head on. This 
debate is extensively discussed in S Greer and L Wildhaber, ‘Revisiting the Debate about “constitutionalising” 
the European Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 12 Human Rights Law Review 655. Additionally, the question of 
how international courts can be more effective is different from the one of why we need them. See LR Helfer 
and AM Slaughter, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication’ (1997) 107 Yale Law Journal 
273. Nevertheless some commentators argue for reopening the debate on legitimacy. For such an example, see J 
Christoffersen, ‘Individual and Constitutional Justice: Can the Power Balance of Adjudication Be Reversed?’ in 
J Christoffersen and MR Madsen (eds), The European Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics, (OUP, 
Oxford 2011) 181. ‘It is now time to look beyond the horizon and reconsider the power balance between 
national and international authorities.’ Ibid, 181.  
5
 R Spano, ‘Universality or Diversity of Human Rights?: Strasbourg in the Age of Subsidiarity’ (2014) 14 
Human Rights Law Review 487. This criticism culminated in the Draft Brighton Declaration that was leaked by 
the Guardian on 28 February 2012. According to this draft, the Court should override a state’s interpretation 
only if the ‘national court clearly erred in its interpretation or application of the Convention rights.’  
6
 M O’Boyle, ‘The Future of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1862, 1867. 
7
 Spano, (n 5) 488. 
8
 C Gearty, On Fantasy Island: Britain, Europe, and Human Rights (OUP, Oxford, 2016). Tom Zwart makes 
the general point that ‘the only way in which Court insiders can explain the criticism is to frame it in terms of 
the ignorance and narrow-mindedness of those who express it.’ T Zwart, ‘More Human Rights than Court: Why 
the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights Is in Need of Repair and How It Can Be Done’ in S 
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human rights lawyers about the motives that animate these critiques. I argue, nevertheless, 
that the critical position has a solid intellectual core that can be detached from those ill-
conceived motivations.  
The purpose of the present paper is threefold. First, my ambition is to improve the 
analytical framework that is used to assess the legitimacy of the Court.9 The Court’s authority 
can neither be established nor refuted by a single master-argument. What we need is a careful 
balancing exercise and this piece aims to set out the main elements of the justificatory 
equation.10 Second, using this framework, I intend to put forward the outline of a coherent 
critique of the European human rights regime. Third, I hope that my paper is able to shed 
light on why it is natural to expect more vocal criticism from the United Kingdom than from 
most other member states of the Council of Europe.  
 
II. Preliminary points 
The question I will address in this paper is as follows: what kind of justificatory reasons do 
states have to construct (or remain members of) international human rights regimes that 
adjudicate and enforce human rights? My aim here is not to offer a causal explanation of why 
the authority of an international court is perceived to be justified, but to engage with the 
reasons that are or can be offered as justification.11 Although the question of whether a state 
had good reasons (or would have good reasons today) to join an international human rights 
system is analytically different from the one of whether it has good reasons to leave the same 
human rights system, I contend that there is a significant overlap between the arguments that 
are relevant in the two contexts. In the course of my inquiry, I will set aside three 
argumentative strategies that are, in my view, inadequate in answering the above question.  
First, every sophisticated theory of human rights adjudication must distinguish 
                                            
Flogaitis, T Zwart and J Fraser (eds), The European Court of Human Rights and its discontents: turning 
criticism into strength  (Edward Elgar, London, 2013) 77. 
9
 I have elaborated a conceptual framework for assessing the justification of domestic constitutional review in T 
Gyorfi, Against the New Constitutionalism (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2016). The present article is, to some 
extent, the extension of this conceptual framework to international human rights adjudication. 
10
 Andreas Føllesdal’s balancing approach is perhaps the closest to my position. See A Føllesdal, ‘Subsidiarity 
and International Human-Rights Courts: Respecting Self-Governance and Protecting Human Rights—Or 
Neither?’ (2016) 79 Law & Contemporary Problems 147. However, by balancing similar considerations, we end 
up with very different conclusions.  See also A Føllesdal, ‘The Legitimacy of International Human Rights 
Review: The Case of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2009) 40 Journal of Social Philosophy 595; A 
Føllesdal, ‘The Legitimacy Deficits of the Human Rights Judiciary: Elements and Implications of a Normative 
Theory’ (2013) 14 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 339. 
11
 As to the empirical or de facto legitimacy of international courts, see LR Helfer and KJ Alter, ‘Legitimacy 
and Lawmaking: A Tale of Three International Courts’ (2013) 14 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 479. 
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between political principles and political institutions. My contention is that all attempts that 
focus only on the general importance of or general commitment to human rights are doomed 
to fail since the question at hand is primarily an institutional one. A general commitment to 
human rights is unable to settle the institutional question of how human rights should be 
adjudicated and enforced. The flip side of this point is that challenging the European human 
rights regime cannot be conflated with the criticism of human rights as such. The proponents 
of the institutional status quo cannot vindicate the moral high ground for themselves and 
cannot claim that they are the only ones who take human rights seriously.  
Second, the justification of human rights regimes is significantly different from the 
justification of other forms of international cooperation. There are certain goods that, by their 
very nature, can be produced only at a transnational level. As the Brexit referendum shows, 
different countries might assign different weight to the value of being a member of the 
European single market. However, if a country values the membership in such a cooperation, 
it cannot create such a market alone. Creating a single market requires, by definition, the 
cooperation of more countries. By contrast, the protection of human rights does not 
necessarily require such a collective action. It follows from the above distinction that one can 
have different views on the different forms of international cooperation. One can be, for 
instance, an ardent advocate of the European single market (and what it entails) and, at the 
same time, be a critic of the European human rights regime. To summarise the previous two 
points, the critical position presupposes neither rights-scepticism nor Euroscepticism.  
Third, my argument is based on the assumption that human rights have very often 
more than one reasonable interpretation. Even if each right has an uncontroversial core 
meaning, my contention is that the cases that the ECtHR finds admissible and originate from 
stable democracies typically do not belong to this category. The existence of reasonable 
rights disagreements implies that an adequate justificatory theory cannot rely on the outcome 
of particular decisions as the criterion of institutional legitimacy. It is a non-starter to argue 
that the ECtHR got it right in case x and that it made a decision that is superior to the one that 
was delivered by a domestic court. Although outcome-related considerations should play an 
important role in the justificatory discourse, these considerations must be relatively general 
and focus on the epistemological and motivational features of institutions rather than the 
outcome of particular decisions. This restriction on the eligible justificatory arguments has 
far-reaching methodological implications – a few of them are worth emphasising here.  
The debate about the legitimacy of the European human rights regime is dominated 
by human rights lawyers (including the judges of the Court) whose primary expertise is on 
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doctrinal issues and whose research focuses on the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court. 
However, if an adequate justificatory theory must centre around general institutional 
considerations rather than around the evaluation of particular decisions, then this expertise on 
doctrinal issues can play only a limited role in the justificatory debate. Assessing the 
epistemological performance of an institution and the motivations of its members is not a 
matter of doctrinal expertise.  
My argument also aims to demonstrate that many of the relevant justificatory 
considerations are empirical in nature. Whether a state has good reasons to confer authority 
on an international human rights court depends both on the robustness of its own political 
institutions and the extent to which it can influence other states. As Goodman and Jinks state, 
‘regime design choices in international law turn on empirical claims about how states behave 
and under what conditions their behaviour changes.’12 I claim that these empirical 
considerations do not only provide the political context for the justification of the European 
human rights regime but are an integral part of the justificatory exercise.  
Within the confines of this article, it is impossible to support my argument with 
sufficiently nuanced empirical analysis. However, I hope that even my sketchy empirical 
observations are able to establish the claim that the justification of the European human rights 
regime is contextual. The strength of the relevant arguments and the balance thereof can 
change over time. Perhaps more importantly, the strength of the proffered arguments might 
also vary from country to country. Different countries do not only perceive the justification of 
the present international human rights framework differently, but they indeed have different 
reasons to endorse the authority of the ECtHR.  
 
III. The argument from sovereignty 
In a short paper supporting the role of the Strasbourg court, Letsas argues that ‘there is no 
objection to be made against the legitimacy of the Strasbourg Court that cannot equally be 
made against the UK Supreme Court.’13 It is beyond the scope of the present paper to address 
the justifiability of domestic constitutional review. However, I contend that even if domestic 
constitutional review is justified, it does not automatically follow that transnational human 
rights review is also justified, since there is an important difference between domestic and 
                                            
12
 R Goodman and D Jinks, ‘How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law’ 
(2004) 54 Duke Law Journal 621, 622. 
13
 G Letsas, ‘In Defense of the European Court of Human Rights’ available at: 
<http://www.heritagescience.ac.uk/human-rights/news/documents/prisoners-vote.pdf> 
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international courts.  
The institutions of a state, including its courts, act on behalf of a political community 
that is considered the ultimate source of political authority within the boundaries of that state. 
When a government confers authority on an international organisation, it gives up part of its 
own authority and transfers some decisions from the political community to international 
institutions. We do not expect and cannot demand states to give up part of their authority 
without justification. In other words, there is a prima facie reason against such a transfer of 
authority. The asymmetry between domestic and international courts can be explained away 
only by challenging the right of a political community to govern itself and assume that the 
authority of international courts is independent of sovereign states.  
My argument is predicated on the assumptions that (1) there is no European wide 
demos that could be considered the location of final political authority in Europe;14 (2) Even 
if there were such a demos, it is not coextensive with the citizenry of the member states of the 
Council of Europe; (3) If the European political order is understood as a demoi-cracy where 
separate peoples jointly exercise political authority, then ‘No liberal democratic People is 
incorporated into a political order and subjected to constitutional rules against the approval of 
its constitutive power.’15  
Claiming that the transfer of a state’s authority requires justification, however, does 
not lead us very far. States routinely give up part of their authority for various reasons. 
‘Taking back control’ is valid, but, on its own, not a particularly strong argument. To 
understand the justificatory equation that is relevant in the specific context, we must clarify 
both the cost of and the justifications for transferring part of a state’s authority to 
international human rights courts. The present section focuses on the ‘sovereignty cost’16 of 
such a transfer of authority and the following subsections will scrutinise the justification for 
such a move.  
The sovereignty cost of a human rights regime depends on many factors, including 
how the international court in question can be accessed, what types of remedies the court can 
provide, how robust the scrutiny of the court is and how much weight national courts give to 
                                            
14
 This does not imply the claim that there is no European public sphere or that some elements of a European-
wide political community do not exist.  
15
 F Cheneval, S Lavenex and F Schimmelfennig, ‘Demoi-cracy in the European Union: Principles, Institutions, 
Policies’ (2015) 22 Journal of European Public Policy 1, 4. 
16
 I borrow the term from A Moravcsik, ‘The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in 
Postwar Europe’ (2000) 54 International Organization 217, 227. 
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the jurisprudence of the international court in question.  
As is well-known, in the first years of its existence, the ECtHR did not seem to 
develop into a high-profile institution, and the expectation was that its operation would not 
really affect mature democracies.17 To put it in the terminology of the present article, the 
sovereignty costs of the regime were perceived to be marginal. This was probably a decisive 
consideration for many countries, including the United Kingdom, that allowed them to accept 
the jurisdiction of the court and the right of individual petition.18 Today, due partly to the 
changing attitude of the Court and partly to the member states’ own decisions, the situation is 
fundamentally different. The ECtHR is often characterised as the de facto constitutional court 
of Europe.19 Although this description is a bit vague, with proper qualifications it can serve as 
a useful shorthand to characterise the position of the Strasbourg court. Let me spell out, 
therefore, what I mean here by de facto constitutional court.  
The ECHR enshrines human rights most of which are also protected by national 
constitutions. Even if the textual formulations of the two sets of rights are often different, this 
dual framework creates a potential conflict: there can be a discrepancy between the 
interpretation of domestic courts and that of the ECtHR.20 
In a municipal legal system, such conflicts are most often handled by rules that create 
a clear hierarchy between the conflicting interpretations. In most countries, there are no 
similar formal rules that would neatly handle the potential conflict between the conflicting 
interpretations of domestic and international courts.21 As Nico Krisch explains, there is not a 
neat legal hierarchy between the rival interpretations of overlapping rights: ‘We find different 
norms and actors competing for ultimate authority; and since they lack a common legal frame 
of reference, they compete, to a large extent, through politics rather than legal argument.’22  
A lot has been written recently about the precise nature of the relationship between 
domestic courts and the ECtHR.23 I cannot do justice to the complexity of this question 
                                            
17
 MR Madsen, ‘The Challenging Authority of the European Court of Human Rights: From Cold War Legal 
Diplomacy to the Brighton Declaration and Backlash’ (2016) 79 Law & Contemporary Problems 141, 145. 
18
 Ibid, 151. 
19
 Ibid, 166. 
20
 G Luebbe-Wolff, ‘Who Has the Last Word? National and Transnational Courts—Conflict and Cooperation’ 
(2011) 30 Yearbook of European Law 86, 87-8. 
21
 But see, for instance, Art. 94 of the Dutch Constitution that declares that treaty provisions override conflicting 
national statutes. 
22
 N Krisch, ‘The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law’ (2008) 71 The Modern Law Review 183, 
184. 
23
 E Bjorge, Domestic Application of the ECHR: Courts as Faithful Trustees (OUP, Oxford, 2015); J Gerards 
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within this article, and so will paint with a broad brush here. However, I submit that, as a 
crude generalisation, we can say that the Strasbourg court does not simply interpret an 
international human rights treaty, but also determines the meaning of domestic constitutional 
rights when there is an overlap between a domestic constitution and the ECHR.  
This is more straightforward in those countries where Convention rights themselves 
have constitutional status. The Austrian constitution of 1945, for instance, did not have a 
modern bill of rights and therefore the ECHR was elevated to constitutional status in 1964.24 
The United Kingdom also lacked a comprehensive bill of rights before the Human Rights Act 
1998 (hereafter HRA) was enacted. As is well known, the HRA does not lay down a new list 
of fundamental rights but incorporates Convention rights into domestic law.  
But even in those countries where domestic constitutional rights have their own 
textual identity and the domestic constitution is of higher rank than the statute that 
incorporates the Convention, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has an immense influence on 
domestic constitutional law. Constitutional review bodies tend to, but more importantly are 
required to interpret the rights enshrined in domestic constitutions taking into consideration 
Strasbourg case law. In some countries, like Spain and Portugal, there is an explicit 
constitutional requirement to interpret constitutional rights in light of the analogous 
provisions of international law.25 In other countries, the doctrine of convention-friendly 
constitutional interpretation of domestic constitutional rights was developed by constitutional 
courts.26 
My claim about the role of the Strasbourg court in determining the content of 
domestic constitutional rights is a qualified one. There are at least three qualifications: (1) 
When the Strasbourg case law is not settled, domestic courts can engage in a dialogue with 
the Court and play a proactive role in shaping its jurisprudence.27 (2) In other cases, the 
                                            
and J Fleuren (eds), Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and of the Judgments of the 
Ecthr in National Case Law: A Comparative Analysis (Intersentia, Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland 2014). 
24
 Art. 149 (1) of the Austrian constitution refers back to the general rights of nationals enshrined in the Basic 
Law of 21 December 1867. 
25
 Constitution of Spain, Art. 10 (2); Constitution of Portugal, Art. 16 (2). 
26
 As the Görgülü decision of the German Constitutional Court (FCC) states, ‘the guarantees of the Convention 
influence the interpretation of the fundamental rights and constitutional principles of the Basic Law. The text of 
the Convention and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights serve, on the level of constitutional 
law, as guides to interpretation in determining the content and scope of fundamental rights and constitutional 
principles of the Basic Law, provided that this does not lead to a restriction or reduction of protection of the 
individual’s fundamental rights under the Basic Law - and this the Convention itself does not desire.’ 111 
BVerfGE 307, 317. In a later decision, the FCC seems to give even stronger status to the jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg court. 128 BVerfGE, 326, 370-371.   
27
 E Bjorge, ‘National Supreme Courts and the Development of ECHR Rights’ (2011) 9 International Journal 
  9 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation confers the authority of determining what Convention-
rights mean on domestic institutions. (3) Even when there is settled case law, many domestic 
courts have elaborated on the limits of their loyalty to the Strasbourg court.  
In the United Kingdom, for instance, the Supreme Court vindicated the right to 
deviate from Strasbourg jurisprudence if the Strasbourg court misunderstood domestic law or 
following Strasbourg case law would be inconsistent with some fundamental constitutional 
principles of the United Kingdom.28 Similarly, the Görgülü decision of the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany (FCC) sets limits on the FCC’s loyalty to Strasbourg.29 
However, the fact that this loyalty has limits is compatible with the general principle that 
within these limits domestic courts follow and are required to follow the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR even if they disagree with the content of a decision.30 Although Lord Roger’s famous 
dictum ‘Argentoratum locutum: iudicium finitum - Strasbourg has spoken, the case is 
closed’31 must be qualified, it captures well what I call here the general rule.  
I will treat the claim that the ECtHR is the de facto constitutional court of Europe as a 
shorthand for this qualified primacy of Strasbourg jurisprudence over domestic human rights 
decisions. Although domestic courts remain the final authorities on the interpretation of 
domestic constitutional rights, this final authority is compatible with the qualified primacy 
they attribute to the decisions of the ECtHR in the interpretation of those rights. Therefore, 
when we assess the legitimacy of the present European human rights regime, the question is 
not simply why states construct international human rights courts in general, but why they 
make the ECtHR the final arbiter of their domestic constitutional rights.  
Human rights do not provide us with algorithms that mechanically decode the meaning of 
legal provisions; in order to apply these provisions to particular situations, we have to inject 
meaning into these abstract provisions. Choosing one particular conception of an abstract 
concept instead of another will inevitably reflect the moral outlook of the interpreter.32 
Defining the more precise meaning of human dignity, equality, privacy or freedom is not a 
                                            
of Constitutional Law 5. 
28
 R v Horncastle [2009] UKSC 14, [2010] 2 AC 373, para 11; Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] 
UKSC 45, [2011] 2 AC 104, para 48.  
29
 111 BVerfGE, 307, 319. See also Luebbe-Wolff (n 20) 87; F Hoffmeister, ‘Germany: Status of European 
Convention on Human Rights in Domestic Law’ (2006) 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law 722, 729. 
30
 See, for instance, 120 BVerfGE, 180 (Caroline III) or R (on the application of Chester) v Secretary of State 
for Justice [2013] UKSC 63, [2014] A.C. 271. 
31
 Secretary of the State for the Home Department v AF (No3) [2009] UKHL 28, [2010] 2 AC 269, para 98. 
32
 Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge MA, 1996) 1-38. 
  10 
trivial matter but is among the most significant moral decisions a political community can 
make. Transferring these decisions to an international court incurs significant costs on a 
political community and, therefore, such a transfer of authority requires robust justification.  
I have argued above that at present there is only a nascent European political community 
and this political community cannot be considered as the ultimate source of political 
authority. It should be noted, however, that the governments and the citizens of different 
European states have different attitudes towards the emergence of a European demos. 
Although this question is most often raised in the context of the EU, and the EU and the 
ECHR are legally distinct entities, a country’s general stand on a European demos also 
shapes its attitude toward the ECHR. One factor that explains why the UK is more critical of 
the European human rights regime than other countries is that the idea of an overarching 
European demos has always been glaringly unattractive in the UK. Even before the Brexit 
referendum, David Cameron, then the Prime Minister of the UK, negotiated a deal with the 
EU that exempted the UK from the principle of an ‘ever closer union’.   
 
 
IV. Epistemic considerations 
Although transferring a part of a state’s authority to an international human rights court has 
considerable costs in terms of sovereignty, the benefits of such a transfer might compensate 
for that loss. An international court might be better suited or better motivated to protect 
human rights than national courts. I will turn first to the question of whether international 
courts have an epistemic edge over their national counterparts. I will argue that the exact 
opposite is true and a combination of epistemic considerations and legitimacy-related 
concerns gives us strong reasons to prefer national courts over international ones in the 
specification of human rights. A senior British judge, Lord Hoffmann, argued that: ‘If one 
accepts, as I have so far argued, that human rights are universal in abstraction but national in 
application, it is not easy to see how in principle an international court was going to perform 
this function of deciding individual cases, still less why the Strasbourg Court was thought a 
suitable body to do so.’33 
I believe that Lord Hoffmann touches upon an important point in his lecture but his 
conceptual framework is not nuanced enough to handle the issue properly. Although it seems 
to me that the main thrust of his argument is correct, I aim to strengthen the argument by 
                                            
33
 Lord Hoffmann, ‘The Universality of Human Rights’ (2009) 125 Law Quarterly Review 416, 422. 
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recasting it in a different conceptual framework.  
First of all, I submit that the term ‘application’ is too vague for our present purposes. 
When applying abstract human rights provisions to particular cases, there are usually many 
premises in the argument that mediate between the abstract human rights provision and the 
facts of the case. To put it differently, judges are required to choose one of the rival 
interpretations or conceptions of abstract human rights provisions, that is to say, they are 
required to specify or articulate the meaning of the said rights before they can apply them to 
the facts of the case.34 For instance, when the Court asserts that the decision about our own 
death is within the scope of the right to private life, this premise mediates between the 
abstract right and the facts of the case, but this specification itself does not require the 
intimate knowledge of the latter.35  
Lord Hoffmann is right to argue that when applying general norms to particular fact 
situations, a domestic court usually has a more intimate knowledge of the factual 
circumstances than an international court and in those cases, the former has an epistemic edge 
over the latter. This insight is part of the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court and is 
acknowledged by the doctrines of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation. However, this 
leaves open the more interesting question of whether domestic courts should also have pre-
eminence in the specification of abstract human rights. The better understanding of the facts 
of particular cases does not justify that they should have pre-eminence in the process of 
specification, but this is exactly what I will argue for here.  
The starting point of my argument is that our views on and attitudes to the 
adjudication of human rights are informed and shaped by two fundamentally different 
positions on moral epistemology, that I will call the Enlightenment View of Reason and 
Reasonable Pluralism, respectively.  
The proponents of what Gaus calls the Enlightenment View of Reason believe that 
reasonable people will converge on true propositions since they all share the capacity of 
reason, and the norms of good reasoning are the same for everyone.36 So even if we disagree, 
for instance on the legality of assisted suicide, one of the rival positions on the issue is 
objectively correct and the other positions are incorrect and, therefore, unjustified.  
                                            
34
 W Sadurski, ‘Rights and Moral Reasoning: An Unstated assumption—A Comment on Jeremy Waldron’s 
“Judges as Moral Reasoners”’ (2009) 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law 25, 27. 
35
 Pretty v the United Kingdom, Application No 2346/02, Merits, 29 April 2002, para 67.  
36
 GF Gaus, Contemporary Theories of Liberalism: Public Reason as a Post-Enlightenment Project (Sage, 
London, 2003) 3. 
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The idea of Reasonable Pluralism does not challenge the possibility of objectively 
true moral propositions; it puts forward a claim not about their truth but about their 
justifiability.37 Its central tenet is that even if there are moral propositions that can be justified 
to each person, on most complex moral issues people will reasonably hold different views.38 
A will be justified in holding p while B will be justified in holding non-p. If that is the case, 
both p and non-p are inconclusively justified.39  
As there seems to be a tension between the idea of Reasonable Pluralism and the 
universality of human rights, it is important to clarify their relationship here. When people 
claim that human rights are universal, they often endorse two distinct theses about human 
rights. (1) When someone claims that A has a human right to x, she makes a claim about the 
scope and the preconditions of the said right. Every human being, so the argument runs, has 
the right to x by virtue of being human, regardless of their membership in any political 
community or their personal qualities and circumstances. This is a substantive moral claim 
about the scope of human rights and not an epistemological one. The substantive claim may 
or may not be supported by universally justified reasons. In addition, many advocates of 
human rights also endorse the epistemic claim that (2) human rights are universally justified 
and that no reasonable person can reject such claims.  
The idea of Reasonable Pluralism is an epistemic position and as such is agnostic on 
(but is compatible with) the thesis of universal scope. It is also compatible with the idea that 
some human rights claims are universally justifiable. However, the proponents of this 
position hold that the specification of human rights is very often subject to reasonable 
disagreement and we cannot expect even in the long run that such disagreements will 
disappear. To use computer parlance, reasonable disagreement is not a bug, but a feature of 
the human condition.  
Since the text of human rights documents do not impose sufficiently strong limits on 
the discretion of judges and they themselves often revolve around complex moral issues, the 
interpretation of human rights (both determining the scope of those rights and balancing them 
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against the public interest) is also subject to reasonable disagreements. The questions of how 
freedom of expression should be balanced against the right to private life, or whether the right 
to private life encompasses the right to decide how we want to die, or how freedom of 
religion should be balanced against the prohibition of discrimination, all give rise to 
reasonable disagreements. However, the term Reasonable Pluralism also implies that not all 
disagreements are reasonable. This insight also applies to the interpretation of human rights. 
Human rights might have interpretations that are beyond the range of reasonable alternatives. 
Although the two positions outlined above say nothing about political institutions, by 
adding some further premises to the argument, the two views will have far-reaching 
implications for institutional design: they will lead us to different benchmarks to assess the 
performance of our institutions. According to the Enlightenment View of Reason, if a judge 
believes that her position is the true one, she also has good reasons to believe that her position 
is justifiable to everyone else, that is, it is universally justified, irrespective of the actual 
beliefs others hold. If moral principles are universally justified, an Italian, a Russian and a 
British judge are in symmetrical positions and have equal access to the universally justified 
specifications of human rights. In that case, we have no general epistemic reason to prefer 
domestic courts to international ones or international courts to domestic ones. 
By contrast, if one believes that the idea of Reasonable Pluralism is the superior view 
on moral epistemology, as I do, she must admit that even if she believes p to be true, it does 
not follow that p is justifiable to everyone. Whether p is justifiable to other people depends 
on what other beliefs they hold.40 If this is correct, it is highly unlikely that judicial decisions 
meet the criterion of universal justifiability. Even to make a plausible claim to that effect, 
judges should be able to monitor the belief systems of others. Most often courts, including the 
Strasbourg court, develop a reasonable but inconclusively justified interpretation of abstract 
human rights. (And the dissenting judges of the same court often develop another, also 
reasonable position.) By transferring the authority to specify human rights from national 
courts to international ones, the reasonable but inconclusively justified views of a domestic 
court are replaced by those of an international court.  
The Enlightenment View of Reason underlies the attitude of many scholars of 
international institutions. For instance, writing on transnational judicial dialogue, Helfer and 
Slaughter write: ‘Equally important, the resulting decisions can contribute to the development 
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of a genuinely transnational or supranational body of law: a set of principles informed by and 
building on one another, textually and culturally differentiated as necessary but 
acknowledging the promise of universality.’41 
From the perspective of the Enlightenment View of Reason, uniformity has an 
inherent value. (I assume that the value of convergence or harmonisation is parasitic on the 
value of uniformity.) From the perspective of Reasonable Pluralism, the uniform 
specification of abstract human rights is not only unfeasible but also undesirable, even as a 
distant ideal. Since the ‘free exercise of free human reason’ 42 will inevitably give rise to 
different views on the desirable specification of human rights, instead of pursuing the 
promise of universality (as uniformity), we should focus on the fair method of selecting 
someone’s inconclusively justified views when a choice has to be made. If that is the case, 
the question becomes why a political community should elevate the reasonable but 
inconclusively justified views of an international court on the meaning of human rights to 
authoritative status within its own jurisdiction.  
I will argue that there are at least two important reasons against this practice. First, 
even if a moral principle cannot be universally justified, it might be justified to each member 
of a bounded political community. I will call the principles that satisfy this criterion publicly 
justified principles. I will also assume that within that bounded political community, a 
publicly justified interpretation of a human right is preferable to one that is justified only to 
one segment of the community. But even if none of the interpretations of an abstract right can 
actually be publicly justified, the court must at least be able to track publicly justified 
principles.43 The judges of domestic courts are in a better position to assess what is justified 
within the belief systems of their fellow citizens. It would be absurd to claim, for instance, 
that a Russian judge would be particularly well-suited to assess which principles are justified 
in the belief systems of British citizens and vice versa.  
Second, even if a human right does not have a publicly justified interpretation within 
a political community, it is important that a wide range of the reasonable interpretations that 
are prevalent in that community be fairly represented in the decision-making process. An 
international court cannot plausibly claim that it reflects the reasonable views that are 
prevalent in the said community. Although it might be the case that domestic courts also track 
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publicly justified principles very imperfectly and represent the prevalent views of their 
respective communities poorly, all that matters in the present context is their comparative 
advantage over international courts.  
At this point, it could be objected that (1) giving pre-eminence to domestic courts in 
the specification of human rights is likely to make their jurisprudence parochial and (2) it also 
shields domestic practices from international criticism. As to the first objection, there is a 
huge difference between making uniformity a regulative ideal and broadening the pool of 
arguments by disseminating information and sharing good practices on human rights issues. 
Broadening the pool of relevant arguments requires neither the uniform specification of 
human rights nor an international court with the final authority to determine the meaning of 
such rights.  
As many scholars have pointed out, today the judges of constitutional courts engage 
in a global dialogue.44 A court might choose not to participate in this dialogue, but the 
dialogue is open to all. The Canadian Supreme Court, the High Court of Israel, or the South 
African Constitutional Court, to name a few, are respected institutions within the ‘community 
of courts’ and although they work in a different international context than their European 
counterparts, their practice is certainly not parochial.45  
As to the second objection, my position is against imposing a uniform specification of 
human rights on states when human rights have more than one reasonable interpretation (this 
can be called the fine-tuning of human rights). However, as the name Reasonable Pluralism 
suggests, not all disagreements are reasonable. The position I defend has the critical potential 
to challenge those practices that are beyond the range of reasonable alternatives – policing the 
boundaries of reasonableness is compatible with my suggestion. However, when we translate 
the above principles to institutional design, we indeed face a dilemma. If we give too much 
power to an international court, different political communities cannot pursue their own 
interpretation of human rights. If we give too much leeway to states, they can get away even 
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with manifestly unreasonable interpretations of human rights. My contention here is that this 
institutional dilemma does not have a universal solution. We can err in both directions and 
the optimal choice between the two alternatives will depend primarily on the shape of the 
political system.  
Others might object that although they find my argument compelling, all that is said 
here is already accounted for by the doctrines of the margin of appreciation and 
subsidiarity.46 As many commentators have observed, in recent years, the Court has followed 
an increasingly deferential approach that often focuses on the procedural aspect of national 
decision-making instead of the substantive correctness of the decision.47 In the recent 
Copenhagen Declaration, the Committee of Ministers has put even greater emphasis on the 
freedom of domestic courts in the balancing process.48 Robert Spano goes so far as claiming 
that the ‘age of subsidiarity’ has arrived.49 I find this objection unconvincing for two reasons. 
First, my argument does not simply restate the need for a margin of appreciation but gives 
more determinate content to it. The doctrine of the margin of appreciation is compatible with 
both the Enlightenment View of Reason and the idea of Reasonable Pluralism. However, the 
two positions interpret the role of the doctrine very differently.  
According to the Enlightenment View of Reason, the margin of appreciation is 
justified only in those cases when domestic institutions are more likely to have intimate 
knowledge of certain facts but there is no reason to defer to domestic courts in the 
specification of human rights in general. By contrast, the idea of Reasonable Pluralism, 
combined with some plausible premises about legitimacy, suggests that domestic courts 
should play a preeminent role in the specification of human rights in general because they can 
track better those interpretations of human rights provisions that are publicly justified in their 
own political community, and they are also more likely to give fair representation to those 
interpretations that are prevalent in their own society.  
Second, although the question of whether a certain interpretation remains within the range 
of reasonable alternatives itself is open to contestation, it is implausible to claim that the 
Strasbourg court’s activity is limited to policing the boundaries of reasonableness. Even the 
judges of the Strasbourg court admit that there is no consensus among them on the precise 
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scope of the margin of appreciation and some judges strongly oppose the doctrine.50  
More importantly, in many of the landmarks decisions of the Court, where there was a 
disagreement between the judges of domestic courts and those of the Strasbourg court, or 
within the Strasbourg court itself, the outvoted position could hardly be considered as 
manifestly unreasonable. A recent study analyses the reasoning process of the Strasbourg 
court in forty of its landmark decisions, 28 of which cases contained at least one dissenting 
opinion.51 The presence of dissenting opinions suggests (but not proves) that in all these cases 
there were reasonable arguments on both sides of the debate. In line with the thrust of my 
argument, some commentators explicitly acknowledge that one important function of the 
Court is fine-tuning, that is, choosing the optimal specification of human rights.52 Although 
the Court’s recent emphasis on procedural review should be applauded, I believe that the jury 
is still out whether this approach will be consistently pursued. In addition, even the most 
relevant provision of the recent Copenhagen Declaration (28.c) that accommodates furthest 
reasonable rights disagreement, focuses very much on how human rights should be balanced 
against the public interest when applying Articles 8-11 of the ECHR. Reasonable 
disagreement, however, is not limited to the balancing stage of human rights arguments but 
also applies to how the scope of human rights (including but not limited to Article 8-11 of the 
ECHR) is defined.    
 
V. Reasonable disagreement and weak judicial review 
The idea of Reasonable Pluralism, combined with some plausible assumptions about political 
legitimacy, provides us with a general argument for the pre-eminence of domestic courts in 
the specification of human rights. However, this general argument is further accentuated in 
jurisdictions in which the institutional design of constitutional review itself reflects that 
human rights may have more than one reasonable interpretation.  
As is well known to comparative constitutional lawyers, the Commonwealth model of 
judicial review has established a mechanism of human rights protection in which the 
legislature can disregard or override a court’s determination of what a human right requires.53 
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According to section 4(2) of the HRA, for example, a court can issue a declaration of 
incompatibility if it comes to the conclusion that a piece of primary legislation violates a 
Convention right. However, such a declaration does not affect the validity of the challenged 
law. 
The very essence of weak judicial review is that it gives the final say on rights 
disagreements to the legislative body. Subjecting the Commonwealth model of judicial 
review to the supervision of the ECtHR makes this final say illusory. The final say on what 
Convention rights require belongs to the Strasbourg court. Although as a matter of domestic 
public law the UK Parliament can disregard a declaration of incompatibility, the UK has a 
legal obligation to comply with the decisions of the Strasbourg court. This is probably part of 
the explanation of why the UK government tends to comply, almost mechanically, with the 
decisions of domestic courts and why it tends not to exercise its right to the final say.54 From 
a practical point of view, the declaration of incompatibility becomes hardly distinguishable 
from the strike-down power of strong judicial review, and thereby the system loses its 
distinctive feature. Whether this is something that one should welcome or regret depends on 
one’s understanding of the role of the declaration of incompatibility.  
It can be argued that the way the HRA allocates authority between Parliament and the 
courts gives Parliament a legal permission to violate human rights but at the same time puts 
the legislators under pressure to bear the political costs of such an action.55 Looking from that 
perspective, we do not have too much reason to regret that under the supervision of the 
Strasbourg court, Parliament’s final say on human rights issues becomes illusory. 
However, in my view, the HRA has a much more attractive interpretation. The 
alternative interpretation acknowledges that Parliament and the courts are epistemic equals, 
and both Parliament and the courts are capable of developing reasonable interpretations of 
human rights. According to this interpretation, a declaration of incompatibility is not a 
straightforward failure of the government but rather the indication of a rights disagreement. 
Parliament’s legal right not to act upon a declaration of incompatibility should not be 
conceptualised as a legal permission to violate human rights, but as Parliament’s right to stick 
to its own interpretation of a human right in the face of a rights disagreement.  
This is in stark contrast with the approach of most European legal systems where it is 
assumed that the specification of human rights is the monopoly of the judiciary. Rackow’s 
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analysis of the relationship between the FCC and the Strasbourg court lends support to my 
claim. As she puts it, ‘It is not contemplated in the German constitutional context that 
representatives from other constitutional branches than the judiciary criticise or even defy a 
judicial decision. The ECtHR belongs to the judiciary. Therefore the FCC is the only organ 
with the authority to voice such criticism.’56 
The central claim of this subsection is that the finely calibrated structure of the HRA, 
which invites both courts and Parliament to develop their own interpretation of human rights 
and makes reasonable rights disagreement an integral feature of institutional design, fits 
uneasily with the supervision of the Strasbourg court. The supervision of the Strasbourg court 
gives rise to either a practical or a conceptual problem, depending on what status one 
attributes to the interpretation of the Court.  
To spell out this point, let me introduce a distinction between the authoritative and 
authentic status of a legal interpretation.57 If we treat someone’s interpretation as the 
authoritative one, we have a reason to act upon this interpretation from the moment that the 
authoritative decision is made. (An authoritative decision is a prospective reason to act in a 
certain way.) However, if we do not have a reason to believe that the Court’s interpretation is 
the correct one, we do not have a reason to feel ashamed if our interpretation differed or still 
differs from the authoritative one. If the Strasbourg court’s interpretation of the Convention 
has authoritative status, the problem this creates for weak judicial review is a practical one. If 
a member state of the Council of Europe wants to avoid the unfavourable decisions of the 
ECtHR, its institutions should, on the one hand, follow Strasbourg case law where there is 
such a case law, and on the other hand, try to predict how the Strasbourg court will decide 
where there is not such a case law. There is no practical point in developing one’s own 
interpretation of a human right if, for all intents and purposes, what matters is how the 
supervisory institution interprets the human right in question.58  
It is a widely held opinion that a government should feel ashamed or embarrassed if 
the Strasbourg court finds that it has violated a human right. Avoiding international 
embarrassment was arguably a major consideration, for instance, for enacting the HRA.59 My 
contention is that this reaction is adequate only if we believe that the Strasbourg court’s 
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interpretation is the correct one and the government, as any other reasonable interpreter of the 
ECHR, should have reached the same conclusion. To put it slightly differently, this view 
considers the interpretation of the Strasbourg court not only as the authoritative but also the 
authentic one. If someone treats another person’s or institution’s view as authentic, they have 
a reason to believe that the said interpretation is the correct one and that their own contrary 
interpretation has been wrong all along. In that case, the problem at hand is not a practical 
but a conceptual one. The idea of authentic interpretation denies the very possibility of 
reasonable rights disagreements, as it implies that the other interpretations do not have the 
same epistemic status. Attributing authentic status to the decisions of the Strasbourg court is 
incompatible with the assumption (the equal epistemic status of courts and Parliament) that 
makes the Commonwealth model of judicial review attractive to many of its proponents.  
 
VI. The argument from political malfunctions 
The strongest argument for domestic constitutional review is not that courts have an 
epistemic advantage over legislative bodies to make good decisions, but rather that the 
members of the two institutions are differently motivated and the courts’ insulation from the 
political process is a major advantage when it comes to the specification of human rights.60 
By being insulated from the political process, so the argument goes, courts can correct the 
malfunctions of the political system. For instance, courts are thought to be more willing to 
protect the interests of unpopular and vulnerable minorities than the elected branches of the 
government. The logic of this argument can be easily extended to the international context.61  
Although the independence of the judiciary insulates it from the political process, this 
insulation is far from perfect. The malfunctions of the political system can become so 
pervasive that even the judiciary is affected by them. According to Justice John Hedigan, this 
is what happened in Europe in the interwar period. He claims that the main reason for the 
establishment of the European human rights regime was that ‘institutions at the national level 
had failed demonstrably’.62 The recent attacks on the independence of the Polish judiciary 
remind us that the aforementioned threat has not ceased to exist. If this is the case, an 
international court that is not exposed to the pressures of domestic politics might be a more 
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reliable protector of human rights than its domestic counterparts. In addition, international 
human rights courts act not only as external checks on domestic political institutions but can 
also shape the domestic political landscape by mobilising civil society actors and opposition 
parties, strengthening the position of domestic courts that are under political pressure and 
serving as a point of reference for domestic political discourse.  
Although the proponents of the European human rights regime have a valid point, 
they both overgeneralise this argument and lift it out of the context of the justificatory 
equation. As a general claim, Justice Hedigan’s statement is demonstrably false. After World 
War I, there existed altogether 29 democracies, 22 of them in Europe.63 Justice Hedigan is 
right to point out that there was a considerable backlash in the process of democratisation in 
the interwar period: out of these 29 countries, 11, including 10 European ones, turned into 
dictatorships. However, there were 16 countries, including 12 European ones in which 
democratic development was uninterrupted or was interrupted only provisionally and by 
external occupation. The breakdown of national political institutions, therefore, was hardly a 
general phenomenon. 
Let us turn now from explanation to justification. Although it is true that there is a 
certain risk of political malfunctions in each political system, the gravity of this risk varies 
from one country to another. Even without extensive empirical analysis, it seems safe to 
assume that this is much smaller in consolidated democracies with a strong tradition of 
judicial independence and democratic political culture than in new democracies with fragile 
institutions and an autocratic political culture. Addressing political malfunctions provides 
each state with a valid reason for endorsing the authority of an international human rights 
court, but the strength of this argument is contingent on the robustness of the political system 
in question. The weaker the argument from political malfunctions is, the easier the argument 
can be overridden by sovereignty-related and epistemic considerations.  
Of the 47 member states of the Council of Europe, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 
democracy report classifies 14 as full democracies, 18 as flawed democracies, nine as hybrid 
regimes and two as authoritarian states.64 (Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino 
are not on the EIU’s democracy index.) As far as the 14 full democracies are concerned, in 
2017, altogether 44 judgments of the ECtHR found at least one violation of the Convention.65 
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By contrast, Russia, one of the two authoritarian states, generated alone 293 judgments that 
found at least one violation.  
There is a clear correlation between the robustness of the political system and the 
gravity of human rights violations. In full democracies, the number of judgments that found 
at least one violation is 0.16 for one million inhabitants. The respective number is 0.95 in 
flawed democracies, 1.59 in hybrid regimes and 2.06 in authoritarian regimes. The robustness 
of political institutions is also the most reliable indicator of whether a state will comply with 
the unfavourable decisions of the Court.66 If the rationale for an international human rights 
court is the correction of political malfunctions, different member states simply have very 
different needs.  
Some commentators have noticed that the critique of the ECtHR has created an odd 
alliance between the United Kingdom and Russia.67 When someone raises the possibility that 
the United Kingdom could withdraw from the ECHR, commentators routinely point out that 
with that move, the UK would align itself with Belarus and would become a pariah state.68 
Although at first sight, these parallels seem indeed odd and striking, the argument from 
political malfunctions is able to provide a plausible explanation for them.  
Andrew Moravcsik has argued in an excellent paper that the differences between 
consolidated democracies, new democracies, and authoritarian regimes can account for how 
different countries acted during the negotiating history of the ECHR.69 I suggest here that the 
explanatory power of his theory is not limited to the negotiating period of the ECHR but also 
applies, to some extent, to contemporary attitudes towards the ECtHR.  
A.) Authoritative governments do not care much about human rights, they do not 
want any restrictions on their power and, therefore, have a strong motivation to ignore the 
decisions of human rights courts or minimise their impact. Since it is unlikely that they will 
lose their power, they do not have incentives to create insurance mechanisms for the period 
when they are in opposition.70 
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B.) Consolidated democracies might be as critical of strong human rights courts as 
authoritarian regimes.71 However, my contention is that unlike authoritarian regimes, they 
have not only an understandable motive but also a valid justificatory reason to be less 
enthusiastic about such courts. Since they have robust political institutions and a strong 
tradition of judicial independence, they have much less reason to believe that their domestic 
courts will cease to function properly and will become unable to protect human rights on their 
own. Although we cannot eliminate this possibility altogether, we should not assess this 
argument in isolation, but as part of the justificatory equation. It is not unjustified to believe 
that having an insurance mechanism in the form of an international court for the unlikely 
event that the domestic judiciary becomes dysfunctional, does not compensate for the certain 
and immediate costs of the transfer of authority in procedural and epistemic terms.  
The logic of the above argument applies to all stable democracies and is not limited to 
the United Kingdom. However, just as the epistemic argument against international human 
rights adjudication, the argument from political malfunctions also gets a special twist in light 
of the UK’s constitutional traditions. The idea of ‘locking in’ or putting some policy 
decisions beyond the reach of ordinary majorities fits well with the constitutional traditions of 
most European countries. All other European states have entrenched constitutions – that is, in 
these states, amending the constitution requires a more burdensome process than ordinary 
legislation. In addition, no fewer than 14 European constitutions have so-called ‘eternity 
clauses’ that make certain provisions or principles of their respective constitutions 
unamendable. By contrast, the very idea of entrenchment is at odds with the traditional 
understanding of parliamentary supremacy, the most fundamental principle of the British 
constitution.  
C.) Finally, new democracies that are committed to the idea of human rights have 
more reasons to believe that they need an external institution as an insurance in case there 
was a backlash in the process of democratisation. The politicians of the young democracies of 
Central and Eastern Europe, for instance, had good reasons to seek such an insurance policy 
after the collapse of the socialist regime. Since they had no experience with the peaceful 
change of government, by putting some issues beyond the domestic political process, they 
could ensure that at least some decisions could not be changed even if they lost their power. 
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As Moravcsik argues: ‘Only where democracy is established but undemocratic groups 
(military officers, communists, fascists, and religious fundamentalists, for example) pose a 
real threat to its future is the reduction of political uncertainty likely to outweigh the 
inconvenience of supranational adjudication.’72 
 
VII. The argument from reputation 
The question of how reputational concerns motivate states is discussed extensively in the 
theory of international law and international relations.73 Although most of these studies focus 
on how a country’s reputational interests influence its compliance with international law, 
many of the insights of this literature are relevant beyond the question of compliance. 
Reputational interests can both explain and justify why a state ratifies an international treaty 
in the first place. From this more general perspective, compliance with international 
commitments is only one factor in the overall reputation of a country.  
Each country wants to be respected by others and secure a certain status or standing 
within the international community. Or to be more precise, each country wants to portray a 
certain image about itself and wants to be not simply respected but respected as a polity of a 
certain kind. This image is constituted partly by values the country identifies with. Other 
polities that share the same values serve as a reference group for the country in question. 
However, it is important to note that the image the country wants to portray does not 
necessarily coincide with the one that makes a country appealing to the international 
community.  
For many countries, the liberal conception of human rights is an integral part of the 
image they want to portray. They want to be recognised as a polity that respects those rights. 
A good track record of human rights protection is not only a source of self-esteem but also 
earns them the recognition of other states.  
The reputation of a country is made up of different factors, some of which have 
nothing to do with formal institutions. But perhaps it is not a coincidence that the countries 
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with the strongest overall reputation are exactly the ones that are the most democratic. In the 
previous section, I have already alluded to the Economist Intelligence Unit that publishes 
every year its report on the democratic performance of states.74 The Reputation Institute is an 
organisation that monitors the 55 biggest economies and ranks the ‘brand value’ of those 
countries. Unsurprisingly, the top ten lists of the two rankings are almost identical.75 My 
contention is that the argument concerning a state’s reputation sheds further light on why 
different countries have different attitudes towards the European human rights regime.  
A.) New democracies that aspire to be seen as countries that respect human rights 
consider consolidated democracies as a reference group. Since they aspire to become stable 
democracies, they feel cognitive and social pressure to respect human rights. The cognitive 
pressure comes from the fact that they want to minimise the dissonance between their actions 
and the image they want to portray.76 But they also want to avoid criticism, naming and 
shaming, and want to get positive feedback and public approval from the members of their 
reference group. The mechanism when someone conforms to the expectations and behaviour 
of others without fully internalising the values that create those expectations is called 
acculturation.77 Acculturation is different from persuasion, as it implies only conformity to, 
but not necessarily belief in, the importance of those values. But acculturation is also 
different from tactical concession as it derives not from utilitarian calculation but from the 
identification with a certain reference group.78 
Acculturation is probably one of the most important mechanisms that are responsible 
for isomorphism.79 In the present context, isomorphism means that countries with very 
different traditions and demands create increasingly similar legal and political institutions. 
Isomorphism is a well-documented phenomenon in constitutional design and in the protection 
of human rights.80 The ECtHR has an important role in that process, as the Court is both a 
beneficiary and an agent of acculturation (although the doctrine of the margin of appreciation 
mitigates the homogenising effect of the Court’s jurisprudence.) Today, subjecting national 
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legal systems to the authority of the ECtHR is seen as the norm in Europe. The normal way 
of doing things creates expectations, and deviation from the normal course of action attracts 
criticism and is detrimental to the reputation of the deviant state (for example, see the 
reference above to Belarus as a pariah state).  
The new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, again, provide a good 
illustration of my point. Many of them ratified the ECHR as soon as they could after the 
collapse of their socialist regimes and created domestic constitutional courts. We can safely 
assume that not all members of the new elite of these countries became the honest proponents 
of human rights. However, they wanted their country to belong to the family of liberal 
democracies, identified with the members of their reference group, and ratifying the ECHR 
made their commitments to human rights more credible.81 As Guzman says, ‘the 
[reputational] theory predicts, then, that states with more fragile reputations will make greater 
efforts to comply with international law than would a similarly situated state with a stronger 
reputation.’82  
There is empirical evidence that new democracies sent judges to the ECtHR who 
were, on average, more activist than the ones sent by consolidated democracies, to prove that 
they were good students.83 In addition, judges from former socialist countries were harsher on 
other socialist countries than they were on countries without socialist heritage.84 The credible 
commitment to the protection of human rights certainly improved the reputation of these 
countries. For the same reason, their reputation would be seriously damaged if they left the 
ECHR. But the Court has also contributed to how the citizens of these countries judged the 
reputation of their respective countries. The judgements of the Court have served as a shared 
point of reference by which the participants of the domestic political discourse assessed and 
criticised the actions of others and justified their own actions. 
B.) There are some member states, such as Russia, Turkey, and Hungary that have 
become vocal critics of the Strasbourg court. Of course, these countries also want to be 
respected but want to be respected on their own terms, and not as liberal democracies. It is 
telling, for example, that of all the countries that are monitored by the Reputation Institute, 
the biggest gap between the external reputation of the country and its self-image reputation 
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exists in Russia. While external respondents see Russia’s reputation pronouncedly weak (51st 
out of 55), Russians put their own country’s reputation at the very top of the list (2nd out of 
55).  
These countries no longer identify with the core values of liberal democracies and do 
not treat them as a reference group. In Russia, there is a long intellectual tradition of defining 
Russian identity in contrast to the West.85 Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s prime minister, pursues 
self-professedly illiberal policies and has made ‘Brussels’ one of the targets of his criticism.86 
Although these countries do not necessarily reject the general idea of human rights, they give 
human rights an idiosyncratic interpretation. They increasingly brand the Strasbourg court as 
part of a hostile liberal order that misunderstands and mistreats them. Orbán regularly makes 
derogatory remarks on human rights and considers them idealist theoretical constructions that 
are out of touch with the political reality.87 Both Russia and Hungary are hostile to human 
rights organisations, and stigmatise them as foreign-funded institutions, with the implication 
that they support foreign interests. 
Since these countries do not aspire to be seen as liberal democracies, there is no 
cognitive pressure on them to act as one of them. External criticism is considered, by 
definition, as hostile to the traditions, the values or the independence of the political 
community. Their narrative is replete with references to respect,88 pride89 and honour,90 
suggesting that drawing the attention to their human rights failures is not a form of rational 
criticism but an attack on the distinctive way of life, or the dignity of the nation. At the time 
of writing, the European Parliament has voted to pursue a disciplinary action against Hungary 
over alleged breaches of the EU's core values. Speaking to the members of the European 
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Parliament, Orbán claimed that ‘You are not going to condemn a government but a country as 
well as a nation. You are going to denounce Hungary that has been a member of the family of 
Christian nations for a thousand years.’91  
In these countries, the Court’s jurisprudence has never served or no longer serves as a 
shared point of reference in domestic political discourse. Although civil society organisations 
and opposition parties might refer to the decisions of the Court, these critiques do not appeal 
to the whole political community, as most supporters of the government do not consider these 
decisions as legitimate standards by which the government should be judged.   
C.) Finally, the respect for human rights plays a central role in the self-image of 
consolidated democracies and this is one of the reasons that these countries have a strong 
reputation. However, their reputation as human rights compliant countries builds primarily on 
their own track record and does not rely so much on the stamp of approval from an 
international court. I am not saying that withdrawing from the ECHR would not negatively 
affect the reputation of these states. It certainly would. Regardless of the actual standard of 
human rights protection, the perception would be that they do not take human rights seriously 
enough. Perhaps even more importantly, mature democracies could also be criticised for 
sending the wrong message to those states that would indeed profit from the supervision of 
the Strasbourg court. My point is that their reputation would suffer much less than that of 
new democracies since they could more credibly claim that their system of human rights 
protection is robust enough even without the support of the Strasbourg court.  
The United Kingdom is often seen both by its citizens and external observers as the 
cradle of parliamentary democracy. Westminster is often called - inaccurately - the mother of 
parliaments.92  ‘Teaching grandmothers to suck egg’, the idiom used by Lord Hoffmann to 
characterise the relationship between the ECtHR and UK courts, makes a reference to the 
long tradition of the rule of law and judicial independence in the UK.93Although Lord 
Hoffmann’s position might seem complacent or even arrogant to some readers, this is not a 
reason to disagree with the more modest claim that the UK belongs to the group of those 
countries that could credibly rely on their own democratic credentials.94  
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VIII. The arguments from collective responsibility and 
collective security 
As human beings, we should care about how other human beings are treated by their 
respective governments. The universal scope of human rights gives rise to a general 
responsibility and, therefore, we should demand of our state, let us call it country A, to 
promote human rights worldwide. However, it does not follow without further arguments that 
the best way to act upon this collective responsibility is to demand a uniform interpretation of 
human rights of other countries, including country B. Human rights do not simply exist, 
waiting to be enforced, but have to be interpreted and specified. As they have more than one 
reasonable interpretation, the fact of reasonable rights disagreement has to be factored into 
how we act upon our collective responsibility. Even if country A cares about the human rights 
of the citizens of country B, if there is a reasonable rights disagreement between country A 
and country B, the best course of action for country A regarding country B is giving 
privileged, but not conclusive, status to how the citizens of country B themselves interpret 
human rights. (It is important to note that when I attribute a particular interpretation of a 
human right to country B, I am not assuming that all the citizens of country B share the same 
view. Instead, I refer to the interpretation of a human right that is reflected in the authoritative 
decisions and institutional practices of the state.) This is an implication of the more general 
idea of dignity, emphasised by Waldron: ‘Law, we can say, is a mode of governance that 
acknowledges that people likely have a view or perspective of their own to present on the 
application of a social norm to their conduct. Applying a norm to a human individual is not 
like deciding what to do about a rabid animal or a dilapidated house. It involves paying 
attention to a point of view. In this way it embodies a crucial dignitarian idea—respecting the 
dignity of those to whom the norms are applied as beings capable of explaining 
themselves.’95  
The citizens of country B should be treated not as the passive beneficiaries of 
enlightened human rights decisions but as people who have an independent perspective on 
what human rights require. Therefore, as I claimed above, country A can err in two directions 
with regard to country B. Although it is problematic if country B can get away with the 
manifestly unreasonable interpretations of human rights, it is equally problematic if country B 
cannot pursue those reasonable interpretations of the same rights that are preferred by their 
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citizens. The best course of action for country A with regard to country B is, therefore, 
contingent on the balance of these two considerations. 
Nevertheless, where there is a strong case that country B would profit from joining an 
international human rights regime, provided that other states, including country A, do the 
same, A has a prima facie reason to join the same regime. I will call this the argument from 
collective responsibility.  
Although country A might honestly care about the state of human rights in country B, 
I am not sure that the argument from collective responsibility is strong enough to compensate 
for the sovereignty costs of such a decision and the epistemic suboptimality of international 
human rights mechanisms.  
But we can also appeal to the self-interest of country A to join an international human 
rights regime. It might be in country A’s self-interest to promote human rights in country B, if 
country B’s human rights violations impose externalities on country A. Let me call this the 
argument from collective security. As Luebbe-Wolff says, ‘In the long run, it is in our own 
interest to keep that system effective, because, in a globalized world, the general lawlessness 
and moral corruption that necessarily go along with contempt for human rights are likely to 
cross borders like contagious diseases.’96 
We should not forget that after World War II, one of the reasons for creating the 
European human rights mechanism was to prevent the possibility of totalitarian takeovers. As 
Michael O’Boyle explains, ‘this concept [the idea of collective guarantee] is the cornerstone 
of the Convention system. Without it the treaty would have little sense. The idea of the 
collective guarantee of rights is essentially a reciprocal agreement by the Contracting Parties 
embodied in the Convention and its machinery of supervision, that each of them and their 
peoples has an enduring interest in how fundamental rights are being protected in other State 
Parties.’97 
Once again, the proponents of the ECtHR certainly have a valid point, but they often 
write as if the consideration of collective security was a kind of master argument that 
evidently overrides all other considerations.98 However, this is not the case: the strength of 
this argument is contingent on many factors and varies over time. It certainly depends on the 
nature, the likelihood and the proximity of the danger to be avoided. When the ECHR was 
adopted, it was primarily meant to prevent the countries of Western Europe from sliding into 
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totalitarianism. The Court was supposed to operate as a sensitive alarm bell that signals the 
rise of totalitarianism. The emergence of a totalitarian regime in the middle of Europe would 
have certainly and directly affected every European nation; therefore, one could plausibly 
appeal to the self-interest of each country to give up part of its authority.  
However, as Moravcsik points out, even this possibility did not prove to be a decisive 
factor in the calculations of most countries.99 For instance, although in the light of the 
experiences of World War II the relationship between the stability of German democracy and 
the security of France and the UK should have been quite clear, it did not give France 
sufficient incentive to ratify the Convention or the UK to accept the jurisdiction of the Court. 
By the time France ratified the ECHR (1974) and the UK accepted the jurisdiction of the 
Court (1966), West Germany had become a stable democracy and the chances of a 
communist takeover in France had significantly decreased. 
Since the ECHR came into force, the political landscape has undergone a considerable 
change. Although there are worrying populist and authoritarian tendencies in many European 
states, at present, all West European countries are, using the EIU’s terminology, either full or 
flawed democracies – all the countries that are classified by the EIU as hybrid or 
authoritarian regimes can be found on the periphery of Europe. Although the authoritarian 
tendencies of these countries should be taken seriously, the rise of populism in Western 
Europe has primarily internal causes and cannot be explained by the appeal of the Turkish or 
Russian models. The situation is slightly different when the erosion of democracy takes place 
in a member state of the European Union. Since many decisions in the Council of the 
European Union require only a qualified majority, the democratic backlash of some member 
states imposes a direct externality for stable democracies.100    
Even if my general risk-assessment is completely wrong, we should keep in mind that 
the risk factor is only one part of the equation. Both the argument from collective 
responsibility and the argument from collective security assume that states can be effectively 
influenced and socialised by international human rights regimes. 101 If the authoritative 
tendencies in country B pose a real danger for country A, a court can mitigate this danger only 
if it is able to effectively influence country B. I contend that the strength of both arguments 
                                            
99
 Moravcsik (n 16) 237. 
100 I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for drawing my attention to this point. 
101
 In addition, the proponents of the ECtHR should also establish that we need a court to influence the 
behaviour of member states and ‘less drastic means’ are not available. 
  32 
relies on the chances of successful acculturation.  
The European human rights regime can identify systemic human rights violations but 
cannot coerce states into cooperation. ‘Good faith participants in such regimes are generally 
unwilling or unable to shoulder the enforcement costs necessary to coerce recalcitrant states 
to comply with human rights norms.’102 As the growing number of cases pending before the 
Committee of Ministers indicates, ‘partial compliance appears increasingly the norm in both 
Western and Eastern Europe.’103 
States with authoritarian tendencies might pay lip service to human rights and comply 
with the individual decisions of the ECtHR; however, they will try to minimise the effects of 
such decisions and limit the authority of the Court to what is called in the literature ‘narrow 
authority’.104 Although providing remedies to individual victims of human rights violations is 
important in its own right, the ECtHR is simply not in the position to give effective remedy to 
839 million people without the contribution of the member states.105 Therefore, the success of 
the European human rights regime depends on whether the behaviour of non-cooperating 
states can be changed.  
The precondition of acculturation is that countries without long democratic tradition 
consider liberal democracies as a reference group and identify with core liberal values. 
However, some countries, such as Russia, Turkey and Hungary, aspire to provide an illiberal 
alternative to constitutional democracies rather than to become one of them. Without the 
resources and willingness to coerce the states that do not comply with human rights standards 
and without the preconditions of successful socialisation, neither the argument from 
collective responsibility nor the argument from collective security is convincing. If my 
analysis is correct, today the argument from collective security offers very little to 
consolidated democracies: it is debatable whether the human rights violations of other 
European countries impose serious externalities on them, and even if that is the case, they 
have little chance to socialise non-compliant states.  
 
IX. Conclusion 
I have argued in the present paper that each country has both valid procedural and epistemic 
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reasons to give pre-eminence to their domestic courts in the specification of human rights. 
Although these reasons must be balanced against other arguments (the argument form 
political malfuncions, the argument from reputation, the argument from collective 
responsibility and security, for example), the strength of the latter arguments is contingent on 
the robustness of democratic institutions. I am not claiming here that these considerations can 
never tip the balance of arguments in favour of a strong transnational human rights regime for 
some countries. However, I submit that the balance of arguments is very different in the case 
of stable democracies with a strong tradition of judicial independence and a reasonably good 
track record of human rights protection, such as the United Kingdom. I believe that they have 
good reasons to remain part of the European human rights regime only if the ECtHR applies a 
consistently deferential approach with regard to them and does not replace the reasonable 
human rights interpretations of the domestic courts of those democracies with its own 
reasonable views. Even though the ECtHR currently gives more leeway to national courts 
than before, the Court’s activity still goes well beyond policing the limits of reasonable 
interpretations of human rights.     
Although these considerations are not unique to the United Kingdom, there are some 
further reasons that explain or justify (or both) why the UK is especially critical of the 
Strasbourg court.  Starting with the most obvious point, the idea of an overarching European 
demos as the location of final political authority has always been glaringly unattractive in the 
UK. That is one factor that explains why the UK is more critical of the Court than many other 
stable democracies. Second, the idea of putting certain policy decisions beyond the ordinary 
political process (a method often used to address political malfunctions) is also foreign to the 
British constitutional tradition that is built on the idea of parliamentary supremacy. Finally, 
the supervision of the Strasbourg court fits uneasily with a domestic system of human rights 
protection that gives the final say on what human rights require to the legislature, and is, 
arguably, predicated on the idea that legislators and courts are epistemic equals when it 
comes to the specification of human rights.  
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